Chuangjinhexin, Soochow, and Golden Eagle’s debt base lost more than 5% this year

Chuangjinhexin, Soochow, and Golden Eagle’s debt base lost more than 5% this year

Source: Financial Investment News reporter Liu Qinghua Original title: Debt-based companies have also suffered huge losses. The “black list” bond funds on the two fund companies have always been known for their low risk and stable returns. From this year to December 4, the average yield of bond funds has reached 4.

72%.

However, there are still five bond funds whose size exceeds 5%, two of which are Chuangjin Hexin and Soochow affiliated funds.

Chuangjin Hexin Zunshangying’s pure claims exceeded 20%, the two funds were less than one million in size, and they failed to make ends meet; the two Soochow funds were due to the aftereffects of defaulting on bonds.

  Bond fund average yield 4.

72% data show that as of December 4 this year, the arithmetic average yield of bond funds is 4.

72% (only Class A shares, the same below). Most of the funds with the largest gains were convertible bond funds, including Southern Greek Yuan convertible bonds, Huitianfu convertible bonds A, China-Europe convertible bonds A, etc., yield.Reached 29.

48%, 26.

12% and 26.

06%.

This is mainly due to the improvement of the stock market and the better performance of the stock market since this year.

Even if it is considered as a convertible bond fund, the average yield of the remaining bond funds has reached 4.

44%, GF Juxin A, Nuoan Lianchuang Shunxin A and other three funds yielded more than 20%.

  It is against this background that the eliminated bond funds are particularly noticeable, especially with losses of more than 20%.

Data show that in the above range, there are a total of 21 bond fund sizes, 5 of which exceed 5%.

Chuangjinhexin distinguished pure surplus debt has exceeded 20 this year.

49%, the expected range is comparable to equity funds.

Soochow’s two funds Soochow Dingli, Soochow Dingyuan double debt A replaced 10 respectively.

69% and 8.

89%.

  In addition, Chuangjin Hexin Zuntaitai Pure Bond and Golden Eagle Tianxiang Pure Bond respectively replaced 7.

49% and 6.

28%.

Can be polished, Chuangjin Hexin and Soochow Fund each have 2 bond funds to replace more than 5%.

  The two debt bases of Chuangjin Hexin “one day is not as good as one day”.

The fund was established on January 7, 2016, and its initial fundraising was 200 million.

It was equipped with dual fund managers: Among them, Wang Yibing was the director of the company’s fixed income department. In August this year, Wang Yibing left the fund manager of the fund, leaving Zheng Zhenyuan alone to continue his management.

  This fund has had many good performances in the past two years. In 2017 and 2018, the fund achieved 2 respectively.

81% and 7.

The return rate of 48% is higher than the average level of similar funds.

So why is the fund’s performance bottom this year?

Perhaps the fund has been “in name only” since this year.

  Data show that the fund had a total of 4.
.

9.8 billion copies, asset scale 5.

At the beginning of this year, there were only 800,000 copies left. In the middle of last year, the fund’s institutional investors held a 99% share.

99%, it can be seen that institutional investors have withdrawn in the fourth quarter of last year.

  Perhaps it is because the fund’s assets have been very small since this year, and the investment operation has been unable to make ends meet.
Therefore, the fund’s net value has fallen a little every day since this year, and it has repeatedly accumulated up to 20%.
  However, it is remarkable that at the beginning of this year, the fund still has 236 holders, with institutional investors holding a share of 62.

76%; in the first half of this year, the last institution also withdrew. At the end of June, institutional investors held 0%, but there were still 209 individual investors.

This is also the important reason why Wang Yibing, the director of the company’s fixed income department, no longer manages the fund, because there is no obvious management value.

In the case that the fund cannot operate normally and make profits, Chuangjinhexin’s distinguished and pure pure debt has not been liquidated and persisted for a year, leaving the remaining small investors to continue to lose money for no reason.

  The situation of Chuangjin Hexin Junjue Thai pure debt is very similar to that of Chuangjin Hexin Junjue Thai pure debt. The fund is also a fund with an institution holding a share of nearly 100%.There are only more than 300,000 shares in the fund. By the end of June this year, the fund had 164 investors, and institutional investors held 91.

57%.

Since the beginning of this year, the fund’s net worth has also been “not as good as one day.”

  The two debt bases of Soochow and “deteriorate” Soochow Dingli is an old fund of Soochow Fund. The decline of this fund this year did not happen suddenly, and it continued the 2016 default of “Mindbreaking of Lightning Bonds”s consequence.

At the end of 2016, Xinwei Group was exposed to huge debt problems, and its trading suspension was announced on April 27, 2017.

After the resumption of trading in July this year, the daily limit fell continuously, and it has dropped from 41 yuan to 1 at one time.

05 yuan.

  Soochow Dingli held 16 Xinwei and a total of 40 at the end of the third quarter of 2016.

520,000 pieces, accounting for 3 of the fund’s net worth.

96%.

Since the fourth quarter of 2016, the fund has been continuously redeemed due to lightning strikes, and the asset size has been increased from 10.

41 trillion US dollars at the beginning of this year.

2.6 billion.

As of the end of the third quarter of this year, its asset scale was zero.

4.5 billion.

  As the scale shrinks, the unsellable bonds 16 Xinwei 01 account for an increasing proportion of the fund’s net worth.

At the end of the first three quarters of this year, the value of the bonds held by Soochow Dingli accounted for 37% of the fund’s net worth.

89%, 48.

13%, 63.

32%.

In the first three quarters of this year, in addition to 16 Xinwei 01, the fund holders’ bond swaps were issued by China National Debt or Treasury bonds.

Therefore, 16 Xinwei 01 is still the culprit that caused the fund to decline.

  If Dong Wu Dingli’s lightning strike can be understood as a fault in investment research, then Dong Wu Dingyuan’s operation is ready to be ill.

The fund was established in May 2016. Until the end of the fourth quarter of 2017, the fund did not hold 16 Xinwei 01, but since the first quarter of 2018, the fund suddenly held a total of 42,000 16 Xinwei 01, accounting for the fund’s net worth.The ratio reaches 10.

48%, became the fund’s largest heavy warehouse bond, and held until the end of the third quarter of this year, the number of holdings remained unchanged, accounting for 67% of the fund’s net worth.

48%.

  This is related to the increase in the Soochow Fund’s estimate of 16 Xinwei 01 in the fourth quarter of 2018.

After raising the estimate, the performance 武汉夜网论坛 of Soochow’s related funds increased, which attracted some investors to buy, and the size of Soochow Dingli and Soochow Dingyuan increased.

Before the risk of 16 Xinwei 01 continued to erupt early this year, the Soochow Fund redeemed the Soochow Dingli distribution it had purchased from itself, leaving only investors to withstand the substitution for this year.The Wu Foundation attracted a lot of bad reviews.